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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 404(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence1
exemplifies the traditional prohibition against introducing
1. See N.D.R. EviD. 404(a). Rule 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
character evidence to prove that a party acted in conformity with
his character on a specified occasion.2 The subsections to rule
404(a) list three broad exceptions to the general rule.3 In particular
instances, the subsection authorizes the introduction of evidence to
prove the character of the accused, the character of the victim, and
the character of a witness. 4 The courts that follow the traditional
position apply the exceptions to rule 404(a) only in criminal cases.'
The courts adopting the traditional position absolutely prohibit
character evidence in civil trials, but allow a criminal defendant to
freely introduce evidence of his character. 6 However, a currently
developing body of law permits character evidence in particular
civil cases. 7
A survey of North Dakota Supreme Court cases reveals that
the court has not yet subscribed to either the traditional or minority
position. This Note urges the North Dakota Supreme Court to
adopt the minority rule and allow the admission of character
evidence in civil trials.
This Note analyzes the foundations of the developing law that
allows the introduction of character evidence in civil cases. Section
II explores the traditional rationale for prohibiting character
evidence in civil cases. Section II also analyzes the circumstances in
which the traditional rule permits the use of character evidence to
show a party's propensity to act in a certain manner. Section III
examines the two theories underlying the minority position, which,
in civil trials, allows the introduction of character evidence to
demonstrate propensity.
except:
(1) Character of Accused. Except as otherwise provided by statute, evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence
of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
Id.
2. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[03] (1986) (orthodox position
rejects character evidence in a civil case).
3. See N.D.R. Evin. 404(a). For the text of rule 404(a), see supra note 1.
4. See N.D.R. EviD. 404(a). For the text of rule 404(a), see supra note 1.
5. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE S 189 (3d ed. 1984). McCormick notes that
j[ti he prevailing pattern now is to exclude all forms of character evidence in civil cases." Id.
6. IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, S 56 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). Once the accused has offered
evidence of his good character to show the improbability that he committed the crime, the
prosecution may then rebut by introducing evidence of the accused's bad character. FED. R. EvID.
404(a)(1).
7. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE S 159 (1954). McCormick observes that "[a] growing minority..
have followed the appealing criminal analogy by permitting the party to introduce evidence of his
good reputation for the trait involved in the charge." Id.
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Three qualifications must be stated at the outset. First, this
Note does not deal with the use of character evidence to impeach
the credibility of a witness.8 Second, when a North Dakota statute
is modeled after a federal statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court
often refers to interpretations of the federal statute to guide its
interpretation of the North Dakota statute.9 Therefore, since rule
404 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence is not materially
different from rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Note
will also examine interpretations of the federal rule. Third, this
Note does not concern the use of character evidence in negligence
actions to demonstrate care or the propensity for accidents. i0 The
North Dakota Supreme Court definitively prohibited this latter use
of character evidence in Thornburg v. Perleberg. i
II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE
Character evidence was first allowed as evidence in 1805 in the
8. See generally FED. R. EvID. 608. Rule 608, in pertinent part, provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only
to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
Id.
9. See, e.g., State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 433-34 (N.D. 1979) (looking to federal
interpretation of rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when interpreting the North Dakota
version). North Dakota's version of rule 404 differs from the federal rule only in that
the North Dakota version adds the phrase "[eixcept as otherwise provided by statute," to the
beginning of the first subsection. Compare FED. R. EvID. 404 With N.D.R. EvIn. 404. Twelve states
have adopted rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence verbatim: Arizona (see ARIz. R. EVID. 404);
Arkansas (see ARK. R. EvID. 404); Colorado (see COLO. R. EvtD. 404); Delaware (see DEL. R. EVID.
404); Hawaii (see HAwAIt REV. STAT. S 33-626-404 (1984)); Idaho (see IDAHO. R. Evio. 404); New
Mexico (see N.M.R. EvID. 404); South Dakota (see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 19-12-4 (1969));
Utah (see UTAH R. EviD. 404); Vermont (see VT. R. EvID. 404); Washington (see WASH..R. Evin.
404); Wyoming (see Wyo. R. EvID. 404).
Fifteen states have adopted rule 404 with minor wording variations that do not significantly
change its meaning: Alaska (see ALASKA R. EvID. 404); Florida (see FLA. STAT. 5 90.404 (1985)); Iowa
(see IOWA R. EvID. 404); Maine (see ME. R. EvtD. 404); Michigan (see MICH. .R. EvtD. 404);
Minnesota (see MINN. R. EvID. 404); Montana (see MONT. CODE ANN. 5 26-404 (1981)); Nebraska
(see NEB. R. EvID. 404); Nevada (see NEv. REV. STAT. S 48-045 (1981)); North Dakota (see N.D.R.
EvID. 404); Ohio (see OHIO R. EvID. 404); Oklahoma (see OKLA. STAT. ANN. S 2404 (West 1984));
Oregon (see OR. REV. STAT. S 40.170 (1983)); Texas (see TEx. R. EViD. 404); Wisconsin (see Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 904.04 (West 1975)). The remaining twenty-three states have not adopted a rule of
evidence similar to federal rule 404.
10. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, S 189. McCormick has noted "that because a small
number of drivers with identifiable characteristics account for the bulk of the accidents, they must
drive improperly as a routine matter, and this provides a better than usual basis for inferring that the
accident in issue resulted from such negligent driving." Id.
11. 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968). In Thornburg the court held that "evidence of reputation for
care or lack of care or of proneness to accident is inadmissible on the issue of negligence." Thornburg
v. Perleberge, 158 N.W.2d 188, 191 (N.D. 1968); see also 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2,
404103] (character of peacefulness is more inconsistent with deliberate conduct, such as running
down a man, than is carefulness of running one down negligently).
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civil case of Ruan v. Perry. 12 In Ruan a Danish shipowner alleged
that an American naval officer fraudulently colluded with the
captain of a French ship resulting in the capture of the Dane's
merchant ship. 13 The New York Supreme Court allowed the naval
officer to rebut the allegation with evidence of his good character. 
14
Thirty years later, in Gough v. St. John, 15 the same court overruled
Ruan and held that evidence of the defendant's good character for
honesty in business transactions was inadmissible in a case for
fraudulent misrepresentation. 16  The decision in Gough thus
established what has since become the traditional rule: character
evidence is allowed in criminal, but not civil trials. 17 Eleven states
subscribe to the traditional rule.18
A. TENETS OF THE-TRADITIONAL RULE
Traditionally, courts have refused to admit character evidence
12. 3 Cai. R. 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), rev'd, Gough v. St. John, 16 Wend. 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1835).
13. Ruan v. Perry, 3 Cai. R. 120, 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), rev'd, Gough v. St. .John, 16
Wend. 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). In Ruan an American naval officer ordered the plaintiff's ship to
stop. Id. at 121. This resulted in its capture by a French ship. Id. Immediately after the capture the
American naval officer had supper with the captain of the French ship. Id.
14. See id. The court in Ruan reasoned that since "imputation of gross fraud was attempted to be
proved by mere circumstances . . . evidence of general character [was] certainly admissible." Id. at
122.
15. 16 Wend. 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
16. Gough v. St. .John, 16 Wend. 645, 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). The court in Cough asserted
that "[character] evidence is, in general, confined to criminal prosecutions .... The case of Ruan v.
Perr is to the contrary; but that is virtually exploded." Id.
17. Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, S 189. McCormick notes that "Itihe rule against
using character evidence solely to prove conduct on a particular occasion has long been applied in
civil cases." Id.
18. The eleven states that allow the admission of character evidence only in criminal trials are:
Alabama (see Bill Steber Chevrolet-Oldsmobile v. Morgen, 429 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Ala. 1983)
(evidence that plaintiff read "get rich quick" literature not admissible in action for breach of
employment contract)); Arizona (see Blankinship v. Duarte, 137 Ariz. 217, __, 669 P.2d 994, 998
(Ct. App. 1983) (evidence that defendant was peaceful man not admissible in civil assault and
battery case)); Connecticut (see Bosworth v. Bosworth, 131 Conn. 389, -, 40 A.2d 186, 187
(1944) (evidence of defendant's cruelty not allowed in divorce case)); Kentucky (see Ellis v. Ellis, 612
S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (defendant not allowed to introduce evidence of good
character for truth and fair dealing in intentional trespass case), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981));
Missouri (see Farley v. .Johnny Londoff Chevrolet, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(plaintiff not allowed to mention defendant's criminal record during civil trial)); Montana (see
Lindberg v. Lcatham Bros. Inc., 693 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Mont. 1985) (evidence of defendant's chronic
tardiness not allowed in wrongful death action)); North Carolina (see Holiday v. Cutchin, 311 N.C.
277, __, 316 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1984) (defendants not allowed to testify they had never been sued));
Oklahoma (see Baker v. First Nat'l Bank, 176 Okla. 70, -, 54 P.2d 355, 358 (1936) (evidence of
defendant's reputation for being a law abiding citizen not admissible in action for replevin));
Pennsylvania (see Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 494, -, 235 A.2d 582, 584 (1967)
(evidence of plaintiff's heroic war record not admissible in insurance claims case in which insurance
company claimed plaintiff participated in arson)); Washington (see Himango v. Prime Time
Broadcasting, Inc., 37 Wash. App. 259, -, 680 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of
plaintiff's extramarital sexual activity not allowed in defamation suit)); Wisconsin (see Eisenberg v.
Continental Casualty Co., 48 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 180 N.W.2d 726, 731 (1970) (evidence of plaintiff's
honest reputation not allowed in fraud case)).
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in civil suits based on the rationale that it distracts the jury from the
main issue at trial 9 and lacks probative value. 20 The traditional
position also relies, in part, on the linguistic argument that the
words "prosecution" and "accused" in rule 404(a) refer only to
criminal trials. 21
Proponents of the traditional rule maintain that character
evidence shifts the jury's focus away from the issue in the complaint
to the quality of the parties' character. 22 This permits a jury to
reason that, because the defendant has committed sufficient wrongs
in the past, he should be punished, whether or not he committed
the current wrong. 23 To preserve the impartial nature of a trial, the
trier of fact must resolve the conflict at issue rather than punish or
reward a party's character. 24
The distraction, prejudice, and time consumption that
accompany the introduction of character evidence create an
administrative inconvenience for courts. 25 Courts tolerate this
inconvenience in criminal trials because they must afford the
accused every possible chance to defend himself.26 The possibility
that the defendant will lose his liberty ameliorates the
inconvenience caused by the use of character evidence. 27 However,
19. 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[031, at 404-20; see also FED. R. EvID. 403
(relevant evidence may be excluded if it confuses issues or misleads jury).
20. Seej. WIGMORE, supra note 6, S 64 (character evidence usually of no probative value).
21. See, e.g., Blankinship v. Duarte, 137 Ariz. 217, 669 P.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1983). In Blankinship
the court reasoned that "[als can be seen from the language itself, [rule 404(a)] only applies in
criminal cases." Id. at __ , 669 P.2d at 998; see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1
404[03] (rule 404 prohibits character evidence in civil cases because the terms "accused" and
"prosecutor" are used). For the text of rule 404(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, see supra
note I.
22. See Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 345 (1820). In Stow the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that evidence of a party's honesty was inadmissible to prove the issue of whether he had impartially
collected taxes. See id. The court was concerned that "[ilnstead of meeting a charge of misconduct by
testimony of not having misconducted . . .he who could throng the court with witnesses to establish
his reputation in general, would shelter himself from the wrongs he had perpetrated." Id. at 345-46.
23. See, e.g., Ellis v. Ellis, 612 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). In Ellis the court held that
evidence of the defendant's honesty was inadmissible on the issue of intentional trespass. Id. The
court maintained that the rule prohibiting character evidence in civil trials derives "from the concept
of fundamental fairness and impartiality." Id. The court concluded that character evidence
transforms "an impartial judicial proceeding into a swearing contest." Id.
24. See FED. R. Evto. 404, advisory committee note. The advisory committee notes state that
admitting character evidence "subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish
the bad man." Id.; see also Creech v. Creech, 222 N.C. 656, 24 S.E.2d 642 (1943). The court in
Creech maintained that admitting character evidence in civil cases "might move the jury to follow the
principles of poetic justice rather than the rules of law." Id. at 664, 24 S.E.2d at 648.
25. E.g., Hancock v. Hullett, 82 So. 522 (Ala. 1919). The court in Hancock stated that admitting
character evidence in civil trials "would make trials intolerably tedious, and greatly increase the
expense and delay of litigation." Id. at 524; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, S 188 (character
evidence causes distraction, prejudice, and delays).
26. See Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn. 468, 81 N.W. 522 (1900). In Hein the court noted that
character evidence is permitted in criminal trials because of the serious consequences to the
defendant. Id. at 472-73, 81 N.W.at 523.
27. See Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 (1982). The rule permitting character evidence in criminal trials "allow[s]
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proponents of the traditional position do not consider the risk
exposure of a civil defendant sufficient to justify the inconveniences
associated with the use of character evidence.
28
A second premise of the traditional rule is that character
evidence lacks probative value in civil cases. 29 A person's character
consists of the mental characteristics and habitual ethical traits he
possesses, such as honesty, impulsiveness or greediness.
30
Proponents of the traditional rule reason that character evidence is
only probative in cases involving a moral quality and that only
criminal cases contain a sufficient moral component to justify
admitting character evidence. 31 Proponents of the traditional rule
rely on the assumption that the conduct typically at issue in a
criminal case deviates from "normal" behavior more than the
conduct typically at issue in a civil case.3 2 Assuming a person's
mental characteristics control the amount that their behavior
deviates from societal norms, character evidence is probative of
conduct involved in a criminal case. 33 Conversely, proponents of
the traditional rule reason that, in civil cases, in which there is
typically a smaller deviation from normal behavior, the probative
value of character evidence falls below the threshold of relevancy set
by rule 401 of the rules of evidence.
34
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL RULE
There are two exceptions to the operation of the traditional
prohibition. First, evidence of a character trait that constitutes the
main issue in a case escapes the prohibition of rule 404.35 Second,
rule 404(b) specifically authorizes the use of character evidence in
the criminal defendant with so much at stake and so little available in the way of conventional proof
to have special dispensation to tell the fact-finder just what sort of person he really is." Id. at 855.
28. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, S 192, at 57 1. Character evidence is not allowed in civil cases
because "the consequences of civil judgment are less severe than those flowing from a criminal
conviction." Id.
29J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, S 64.
30. See People v. Coleman, 19 Mich. App. 250, -. , 172 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1969) (character is
the complex of mental, moral, and ethical traits marking a person).
31. J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, 5 64. Wigmore notes that torts involving violence or fraud may
contain a moral quality. Id. However, the law does not recognize any moral quality present. Id.
Wigmore makes the following assertion: "[wihere the issue is whether a contract was made or
broken, whether money was paid or property improved by mistake, whether goods were illegally
converted or a libel published, there is no moral quality in the act alleged . I... d.
32. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE S 142 (1977) (discussing Wigmore's view
that character evidence has no probative value).
33. Seeid.
34. Id. Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence has a "tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." N.D.R. EvIo. 401.
35. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, 5 187 (when character is put in issue by the pleadings





1. Character in Issue
In some situations, character evidence is necessary to
determine the parties' rights and liabilities under the substantive
law. 37 "Character in issue" refers to character traits that constitute
an element of a claim or defense. 38 For example, the competency of
a driver, an issue of character, is the central issue in an action for
negligently entrusting a motor vehicle to an incompetent driver. 39
Thus, whether the driver truly possesses the character trait
determines the outcome of the case.40 Under rule 404(a), evidence
of character can be admitted if character is in issue.4 1 However,
even when character is in issue, state court opinions occasionally
prohibit the admission of evidence of good character until evidence
to the contrary is introduced. 42 This position presumes that
character is good in the absence of evidence that it is bad. 43
2. Rule 404(b) Exceptions
Although character evidence is not admissible to show that a
36. See N.D.R. EvIo. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. However, it may be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Id.
37. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404 [021.
38. FED. R. EvID. 404, advisory committee note. "Character in issue" refers to cases in which
"[ciharacter may itself be an element of a crime, claim, or defense." Id. Character has been held "in
issue" in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1262 (9th Cir. 1982)
(failure to supervise employee with dangerous character traits); Smith v. Executive Club, Ltd., 458
A.2d 32, 40 (D.C. App. 1983) (damages for emotional distress in a false arrest claim); Allen v.
Toledo, 109 Cal. App. 3d 415, -_, 167 Cal. Rptr. 270, 273 (1980) (allowing unfit person to drive a
motor vehicle); Reynolds v. Jobes, 565 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Mo. 1978) (malicious prosecution);
Cooper v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 52, -, 393 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (1977) (fraud).
391 Cf FED. R. EvID. 404, advisory committee note. An illustration of character in issue is "the
chastity of the victim under a statute specifying her chastity as an element of the crime of seduction."
Id.
40. See id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 404, advisory committee note. The advisory committee stated that since there
is no problem with the general relevancy of character that is in issue, the prohibition contained in
rule 404 should not apply. See id.
42. See, e.g., Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). In Hepps the court determined that character evidence is inadmissible
in civil cases "unless directly in issue, and even then evidence of good character is not admissible
unless and until it is attacked by evidence to the contrary." Id. at , 485 A.2d at 379 n. 1.
43. See id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:539
person acted in conformity with his character, rule 404(b) provides
that character evidence as indicated by prior bad acts is admissible
for a limited number of purposes, "such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident."44 Since rule 404(b) contains no
language specifically limiting character evidence to criminal cases,
the exceptions apply to both criminal and civil cases. 45 Moreover,
the words "such as" suggest that rule 404(b) does not limit the
admissibility of character evidence to prove only those enumerated
issues, but may allow evidence of character for additional
purposes.
4 6
In State v. Stevens47 the North Dakota Supreme Court discussed
the requirements for the admission of character evidence under rule
404(b). 48 The defendant in Stevens appealed from his manslaughter
conviction for the death of the son of the woman with whom he
lived. 49 At trial the prosecution entered evidence under rule 404(b)
of-the child's nine previous injuries. 50 The prosecution argued that
the evidence of previous injuries should be admitted to contradict
the defense that the fatal injury was caused accidentally and to
prove the identity of the person causing the fatal injury. 51 On
appeal the court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence of prior injuries outweighed its probative value and that it
44. See N.D. R. Evin. 404(b). For the text of rule 404(b), see supra note 36. The exceptions listed
in rule 404(b) are invoked in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Lataille v. Ponte, 754 F.2d 33, 35 (1st
Cir. 1985) (evidence that the plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement was not relevant to his
knowledge that guards were not harrassing him); Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347,
1350 (8th Cir. 1984) (evidence that plaintiff's house burned prior to time his sporting goods store
burned inadmissible to show intent); Kerr v. First Commodities Corp., 735 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir.
1984) (prior consent decree concerning unfair trading practices allowed to show absence of mistake
and intent to commit fraud); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir.
1983) (insured's wife's alleged involvement in separate insurance fraud inadmissible to show intent
to commit arson); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 572 (5th Cir. 1982) (performance evaluation
stating arresting officer had hot temper admissible to show intent to harm plaintiff);
Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 1981) (foster father's
molestation of plaintiff's sister relevant to social worker's knowledge that plaintiff was at risk), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Hammann v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 620 F.2d 588, 589
(6th Cir. 1980) (evidence that farmer previously burned six other buildings was admissible to show
intent); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 967 (3d Cir. 1980) (letter detailing prisoner's plan to file
false complaint not admissible to show plan).
45. See N.D.R. EvID. 404(b); Fischer v. Knapp, 332 N.W.2d 76, 85 (N.D. 1983) (rule 404(b)
applies to both criminal and civil cases); Ginter v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins., 576 F. Supp.
627, 630 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (rule 404(b) applies to civil cases); see also Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d
63 (N.D. 1981) (North Dakota Supreme Court applied rule 404(b) in civil case without discussing its
applicability).
46. Uviller, supra note 27, at 878.
47. 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1975).
48. State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251, 257 (N.D. 1975).
49. Id. at 253-54.




should not have been admitted at trial. 52 The court stated that "the
mere invocation of [a rule 404(b) exception] does not end inquiry..
. . It only begins it. ,53 The court in Stevens concluded that a stricter
showing of relevance is required to invoke the "identity" exception
than is required to invoke the other rule 404(b) exceptions. 54 The
court also concluded that the current act in issue must be proven
before the trier of fact may consider character evidence offered
under rule 404(b). 55 This requirement presumably ensures that a
party will not use character evidence admitted under rule 404(b) for
the impermissible purpose of proving that a person acted in
conformity with his character. Because rule 404(b) is a "specialized
rule of relevancy,''56 the court's application of rule 404(b) did not
involve mere "pigeonholing" the bad act into permissible
categories, but rather involved a discretionary balancing.
57
Specifically, the court noted that the dangers of prejudice must be
balanced against the danger of sacrificing too much relevant
evidence.
58
In Lamar v. Steee 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that evidence indicating that a prison guard
52. Id. at 258. The court concluded that evidence of prior injuries had too great a tendency to
stir the passions of a Jury to be admitted into evidence. Id. The court also reasoned that the previous
inluries, offered to prove the identity of the person causing the death, did not meet the high degree of
proof required by the identity exception. Id.
53. Id. at 257.
54. Id. (citing C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE S 190 (2d ed. 1972)).
55. Id. The court quoted from North Dakota Jury Instruction 1316 concerning evidence offered
under rule 404(b): " Evidence of other acts of a like nature cannot be considered for any purpose,
unless you first find that other evidence in the case, standing alone, establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the particular act charged in the Information." Id.
56. Fischer v. Knapp, 332 N.W.2d 76, 82-83 (N.D. 1983). In Fischer the court advanced the
following analysis of rule 404(b):
Rule 404(b) is a specialized rule of relevancy. Accordingly, as with any
determination pursuant to Rule 401, counsel must be prepared to 1) identify the
consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
directed, 2) prove the other crimes, wrongs or acts and 3) articulate precisely the
evidential hypothesis by which the consequential fact may be inferred from the
proffered evidence. Evidence which passes muster up to this point must, in addition,
satisfy the balancing test imposed by Rule 403 which requires the probative value of
the other crimes evidence to outweight the harmful consequences that might flow from
its admission.
Id. at 82-83 (quoting State v. Forsland, 326 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1983)).
57. See Stevens, 238 N.W.2d at 258.
58. Id. (quoting C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, S 190 (2d ed. 1972)). In Stevens the
court stated that the "problems of lessening the dangers of prejudice without too much sacrifice of
relevant evidence can seldom if ever be satisfactorily solved by mechanical rules." Id. at 257; see
N.D.R. EvIo. 403. Rule 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. Id.
59. 693 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1982).
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supplied an inmate with a knife and asked him to kill a second
inmate was admissible to prove the guard's plan to kill a third
inmate in a similar manner. 60 Lamar was a civil rights case in which
an inmate alleged that he was denied access to the courts because a
guard attempted to have him killed if he did not stop filing lawsuits
on behalf of the other prisoners. 6' At trial the plaintiff entered
testimony that the same guard had attempted to have another
prisoner, who was also filing lawsuits, killed. 62 The court reasoned
that evidence offered to prove a "plan" must be sufficiently similar
to the act at issue to ensure that the same person thought of both
actions; the more idiosyncratic the plan and the act, the greater
the probative value of the character evidence. 63 The court
concluded that evidence of the guard's prior attempt to have a
lawsuit filing prisoner killed was admissible under the rule 404(b)
"plan" exception because that alleged incident was the mirror
image of the current charge. 6
4
Thus, character evidence is admissible under the traditional
rule if it comprises the central issue in a case, or fits within one of
the specific rule 404(b) exceptions. 65 By using these exceptions, a
court may admit a small amount of character evidence even under
the traditional rule. 66 This limited use of character evidence under
the traditional rule causes sufficient problems that some courts are
reluctant to expand the admissibility of character evidence.
67
C. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
Proponents of the traditional rule speculate that admitting
character evidence in civil cases would cause an undesirable
expansion of opinion evidence based on psychological
evaluations. 68 Since psychology is the study of mental processes, 69 a
60. Lamar v. Steele, 693 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 560-61. The plaintiffwas active as a prison "writ writer," an inmate who assists other
inmates in preparing petitions for habeas corpus and filing class action suits challenging prison
practices and conditions. Id.
62. Id. at 561.
63. Id. The court stated that "the conduct tendered must be sufficiently similar to the act under
inquiry to minimize any doubt that the two are products of the same mind." Id.
64. Id. The court also reasoned that evidence of a guard's prior attempt to have a writ writing
prisoner killed was admissible under the notice exception of rule 404(b) because it gave the prisoners
notice of the guard's intent to purge all writ writing inmates from the prison. Id.
65. See FEn. R. EvIo. 404, advisory committee note; N.D.R. EvID. 404(b).
66. FED. R. EvIn. 404, advisory committee note.
67. See id. (admissibility of character evidence should not be expanded because it would increase
the use of psychiatric testimony).
68. See id. Concepts of character extend into the areas of psychiatric evaluation and
psychological testing. Id.
69. DoRLAND'S IL.USTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 574 (23d ed. 1982). Psychology is defined as
the science dealing with the mind and mental processes, especially in relation to human and animal
behavior.'" Id.
[VOL. 62:539
psychological examination can reveal a great deal about a party's
character. 70 However, the advisory committee of the Proposed
Rules of Federal Evidence reasoned that the Supreme Court's
decision in Schlagenhauf v. Holder 71 precluded expanding the role of
psychological evaluations. 
7 2
In Schlagenhauf injured bus passengers sought to force the
defendant bus driver to submit to a mental and physical
examination. 73 The Court held that, due to the intrusive nature of
examinations, the mental or physical condition for which an
examination is sought must be genuinely in controversy. 74 The
Court reversed the examination order because the driver's health
was not sufficiently in controversy. 75 The Court concluded that the
"in controversy" requirement is not satisfied by mere conclusory
allegations in the pleadings nor by mere relevance to the case.
76
This strict "in controversy," requirement apparently renders
psychological evaluations unavailable as character evidence to show
that a person acted in conformity with his character because such
evidence is, by definition, not "in controversy." 77
The traditional prohibition against the use of character
evidence in civil trials rests on the premise that character evidence
is not probative and, therefore, not relevant. 7
8  However, rule
70. See R. SIMONS & H. PARDES, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAYIOR IN HEATLH AND ILLNESS, 486
(2d ed. 1984). A psychological examination reveals a person's predictable patterns of behavior, his
responses to stress and the techniques by which he tries to achieve his potential. Id.
71. 379 U.S. 104(1964).
72. FED. R. EvID. 404, advisory committee note. The committee rejected the admission of
character evidence in civil cases because it "would open up such vistas of mental examinations as
caused the Court concern in Schlagenhaufv. Holder .... " Id.
73. Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 107 (1964).
74. Id. at 118; see FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). Rule 35(a) provides:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a
person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court
in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or
legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom
it is to be made.
Id.
75. Scthlaenhauf 379 U.S. at 121.
76. Id. at 118. The Court concluded that rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
the trial judge to decide whether the party requesting a mental examination "has adequately
demonstrated the existence of the Rule's requirements of'in controversy' and 'good cause' .... Id.
at 118-19.
77. Cif FED. R. EviD. 404, advisory committee note. Rule 404 pertains to character evidence
used to suggest that a person acted consistently with his character on a specified occasion. Id. It does
not cover character evidence offered when the character of a party is the central issue in a case. Id.
Thus, rule 404 does not cover character that is in controversy. Id.
78. Cf FED. R. FlViO. 404, advisory committee note. The advisory committee reasoned that
the rule allowing chara,:ter evidence in criminal trials is "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as
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404(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides that
character evidence is admissible in some limited situations. 7 9 These
exceptions establish that character evidence is not necessarily
irrelevant to the determination of how an individual acted in a
given situation.8 0 Proponents of the traditional rule alternatively
argue that, even if character evidence is relevant, it is too
distracting and inconvenient to justify admitting it in civil trials."'
While courts following the traditional rule arbitrarily prohibit
character evidence in all civil cases,8 2 courts following the minority
position carve. out areas of civil law in which character evidence is
permitted.
III. THE MINORITY RULE
A. CIVIL CASES INVOLVING CRIMINAL CONDUCT
In Crumpton v. Confederation Life Insurance Co. 8 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that if
character evidence is admissible in a criminal trial, it should also be
admissible in a civil trial involving an essentially criminal issue.
8 4
In Crumpton a woman shot and killed the insured as he walked
toward her after allegedly raping her one week earlier.8 ' The
insurance company denied coverage under the insured's life
insurance policy.8 6 The insurer argued that the insured's deathwas
not accidental because he had committed a violent act and should
have known that he would be in danger if he approached the victim
again. 87 The life insurance policy beneficiary sought to introduce
evidence of the insured's good character to prove that he had not
to assume almost constitutional proportions and to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the
evidence." Id.
79. N.D. R. Evin. 404(a)(I)-(3). The subsections to rule 404(a) create broad exceptions to the
prohibition of character evidence when the character of the accused, the character of the witness, or
the character of the victim is involved. Id.
80. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 574, 583 (1956).
Professor Falknor states that "the orthodox doctrine . . . making admissible evidence of good
character in behalf of the criminal accused and evidence of bad character in behalf of the prosecution
in rebuttal, establishes the relevancy - the necessary rational probative 'tendency' - of evidence of
this sort." Id.
81. See FED. R. EviD. 404, advisory committee note.
82. For a list ofcases that prohibit character evidence in all civil cases, see supra note 18.
83. 672 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1982).
84. Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1982). The court
concluded that the facts in Crumpton placed the case "very close to one of a criminal nature." Id. The
court emphasized that, had it been a criminal case against Crumpton, evidence of his character
would have been admissible. Id.
85. Id. at 1250. In Crumpton a woman was allegedly raped and beaten in her home. Id. The
assailant threatened to kill the woman's children if she told anyone about the rape. Id. One week
later she took a gun and went out to her garage where the alleged assailant saw her and walked
toward her. Id. The woman pulled out the gun and shot him without a verbal warning. Id.
86. Id. at 1250-51.
87. Id. at 1251. The insured's insurance policy defined accidental death as "death resulting
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committed the rape and had no reason to expect that the alleged
victim would shoot him.
88
The court determined that evidence of the insured's
nonviolent character was admissible.8 9 The court concluded that
the insured's character was placed in issue by the insurance
company's argument that he should have anticipated bodily injury
because he had committed a violent criminal act. 90 However, the
court stated that, even if the character evidence had not fallen
within the "character in issue" exception, it still would have been
admitted.91
The court recognized that the advisory committee of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rejected the use of character
evidence in civil proceedings. 92 However, the court reasoned that
the committee report was not determinative because the tenor of
the case was criminal. 93 Although Crumpton was a civil case, it
focused on the same elements as a criminal rape trial. 94 The court
reasoned that evidence of Crumpton's character would have been
admissible in a criminal rape trial under rule 404(a)(1), which
allows the accused to enter evidence of his good character.
95
Therefore, the court concluded that evidence of Crumpton's good
character was admissible in the civil action. 96 The court added,
however, that the proffered character evidence must be "relevant,
probative and not unduly prejudicial." ' 97 The test formulated by
the court was used in addition to, not in place of, the normal
relevancy requirement of rule 401 .98
The court in Crumpton relied on the case of Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Benigals, Inc.99 to support the proposition that character
from ... accidental bodily injury visible on the surface of the body or disclosed by an autopsy." Id.
at 1250.
88. Id. at 1251-52. Five witnesses testified that the insured was not violent, did not use
profanity, did not make obscene gestures or indecent proposals to women, and did not drink. Id. at
1251.
89. Id. at 1253.
90. Id. at 1252.
91. Id. at 1253.
92. Id.; see FED. R. EvID. 404, advisory committee note.
93. Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1254 n.7. The court asserted that the case, "while actually civil, in
character is akin to a criminal case." Id.
94. Id. at 1253. The court noted that the "focus of the civil suit.., was the issue of rape, and the
resulting trial was in most respects similar to a criminal case for rape." Id.
95. Id.; seeN.D.R. EvID. 404(a)(1). For the text ofrule 404(a) (1), seesupra note 1.
96. Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1253. The court concluded that the district court had committed no
abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of Crumpton's good character. Id.
97. Id. at 1254 n.7; see N.D.R. EVID. 403. For the text ofrule403, see supra note 58.
98. See Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1254 n.7; N.D.R. EvID. 401. Rule 401 defines relevant
evidence as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Id.
99. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
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evidence should be admitted to prove that a person acted in
conformity with their character. 10 0 In Hackbart a professional
football player was injured by an intentional blow from an
opposing player during a football game.10' At trial the defendant
introduced films designed to show that the plaintiff was an
exceptionally violent football player. 10 2 On appeal the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that the
evidence was irrelevant and should not have been admitted. 0 3 The
court in Crumpton noted that the decision in Hackbart quoted rule
404 but decided that case on the grounds of general relevancy.
10 4
Regarding Hackbart, the court in Crumpton stated, "[w]e interpret
the Court's failure to discuss whether [rule 404 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence] is applicable to civil suits as impliedly approving its
use ... to [sic] civil suits.' 1105
Thus, according to the Crumpton decision, the requirements for
the admission of character evidence in a civil case are: (1) the
evidence is offered in a civil case that is criminal in nature; 0 6 (2)
the evidence passes the relevance test of rule 401;107 and, (3) the
probative value of the character evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effects. 108
Although the Crumpton rationale allows the admission of
character evidence in civil cases focusing on any type of criminal
conduct, several states restrict the admission of character evidence
in the civil context to the narrower area of civil assault and battery
cases. 10 9 Twenty-five states have case law that supports the
admission of character evidence in civil assault and battery trials. 110
100. See Crunpton, 672 F.2d at 1253 n.6.
101. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 518 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979). After an interception, while the plaintiff was still kneeling on the ground, the
defendant stepped forward and struck the plaintiffon the back of the head. Id. at 519.
102. Id. at 525. In addition to film of the actual accident giving rise to the lawsuit, the defendant
introduced films of acts of violence between other players. Id.
103. Id. at 526.
104. See Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1253 n.6.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1254. Civil character evidence should be admitted in civil cases "where the focus
is on essentially criminal aspects." Id. at n.7.
107. See id.; seealso N.D.R. EvID. 401. For the pertinent text ofrule 401, see supra note 98.
108. See Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1254 n.7; see also N.D. R. Evio. 403. For the text of rule 403, see
supra note 58.
109. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of Honolulu, 62 Haw. 88, 611 P.2d 989 (1980) (evidence of
plaintiff's violent character admitted to prove self defense in a civil assault case).
110. Eighteen states allow character evidence in civil assault and battery trials on the issue of
whether the defendant acted in self defense: Alabama (see Butler v. Hughes, 265 Ala. 532, -, 88
So. 2d 195, 198 (1956)); Georgia (see Swinney v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 45, , 132 S.E. 228, 230
(Ct. App. 1926)); Hawaii (see Feliciano v. City of Honolulu, 62 Haw. 88, __, 611 P.2d 989, 991
(1980)); Iowa (see Halley v. Tichenor, 120 Iowa 164, 166, 94 N.W. 472, 473 (1903)); Louisiana (see
Rodrigue v. Matherne, 416 So. 2d 577, 583 (La. Ct. App. 1982)); Maryland (see Bugg v. Brown, 251
Md. 99, __, 246 A.2d 235, 239-40 (1968)); Massachusetts (see Brennan v. Bongiorno, 304 Mass.
476, __, 23 N.E.2d 1007, 1007 (1939)); Michigan (see Culley v. Walkeen, 80 Mich. 443, 446, 45
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Two states have adopted evidentiary rules that expressly permit the
introduction of character evidence in assault trials. 
1
In civil assault and battery trials, character evidence is
admissible in two situations. 1 2 First, when a defendant pleads self
defense in a civil assault case, the defendant may enter evidence of
the plaintiff's violent character if that character was known to the
defendant at the time of the incident." 3 The defendant's prior
knowledge of the plaintiff's violent character demonstrates whether
the defendant reasonably apprehended the need to defend
himself. 114
In Feliciano v. City of Honolulu1 5 two brothers alleged that a
police officer assaulted them in their home. 116 At trial the police
officer introduced evidence of the brothers' violent reputations." 7
On appeal the court in Feliciano concluded that the character
evidence was admissible to show that the police officer reasonably
believed there was a need to defend himself.1' 8
N.W. 368, 369 (1890)); Missouri (see Davenport v. Silvey, 265 Mo. 543, 555, 178 S.W. 168, 171
(1915)); Nebraska (seeGolder v. Lund, 50 Neb. 867,872, 70 N.W. 379, 381 (1897)); New York (see
Silliman v. Sampson, 42 App. Div. 623, -, 59 N.Y.S. 923, 925 (1899)); North Carolina (see
Strickland v..Jackson, 23 N.C. App. 603, -, 209 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1974)); Oregon (see Brooks v.
Bergholm, 256 Or. 1, -, 470 P.2d 154, 157 (1970)); Rhode Island (see Martin v. Estrella, 107
R.I. 247, -,266 A.2d 41, 47 (1970)); South Dakota (see Christensen v. Holm, 33 S.D. 174, 177,
144 N.W. 919, 920 (1914)); Texas (see Hall v. Hayter, - Tex. Civ. App. , - , 209 S.W.
436, 437 (1919)); Vermont (see Russ v. Good, 90 Vt. 236, -, 97 A. 987, 988 (1916)); Wisconsin
(see Lowev. Ringe, 123 Wis. 107, 114, 101 N.W. 381,383 (1904)).
Seven states allow character evidence in civil assault and battery trials on the issue of which
party was the first aggressor: Arkansas (see Bookout v. Hanshaw, 235 Ark. 924, -, 363 S.W.2d
125, 128 (1962)); Delaware (see Dingle v. Hickman, 32 Del. 49, -, 119 A. 311, 312 (1922));
Florida (see Pino v. Koelber, 389 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)); Kansas (see Carrick
v. McFadden, 216 Kan. 683, 687, 533 P.2d 1249, 1252-53 (1975)); Kentucky (see Marshall v.
Glover, 190 Ky. 113, -, 226 S.W. 398, 400 (1920)); Minnesota (see Campbell v. Aarstad, 124
Minn. 284, 287, 144 N.W. 956, 957 (1914)); Oklahoma (see Oiler v. Hicks, 441 P.2d 356, 362-63
(Okla. 1967)).
111. See IOWA R. EviD. 404(a)(2)(B). Rule 404(a) of the Iowa Rules of Evidence, in pertinent
part, provides: "Evidence of character for violence of the victim of assaultive conduct offered on the
issue of self defense by a party accused of the assaultive conduct, or evidence of peaceable character
to rebut the same." Id.; see also ORE. REv. STAT. S 40.170(2)(d) (1983). Section 40.170 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes allows the admissibility of "lelvidence of the character of a party for violent
behavior offered in a civil assault and battery case when self-defense is pleaded and there is evidence
to support such defense." Id.
112. For a list of cases admitting character evidence in civil assault and battery trials, see supra
note 110.
113. See, e.g., Martin v. Estrella, 107 R.I. 247, __, 266 A.2d 41, 47 (1970) (defendant's
knowledge of plaintiff's violent character established by evidence of plaintiff's previous assault of
defendant's father).
114. Cf Feliciano v. City of Honolulu, 62 Haw. 88, _ , 611 P.2d 989, 992 (1980) (evidence
probative of reasonableness of fear of bodily harm).
115.62 Haw. 88, 611 P.2d 989 (1980).
116. Feliciano v. City of Honolulu, 62 Haw. 88, _ , 611 P.2d 989, 990-91 (1980). The
brothers contended that the police officer maced them and beat them with his flashlight without
reason. Id.
117. Id. The defendant testified that the plaintiffs were "beat characters," characters on the
officer's patrol beat that are regularly involved in violence or criminal activity. Id.
118. Id. at -, 611 A.2d at 991-92.
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Second, character evidence is admissible in civil assault and
battery cases when the evidence concerning which party committed
the first act of violence conflicts. 1 9 In this situation, evidence of
both parties' predisposition for violence is admissible, regardless of
whether the other party previously knew about it. 120 In Carrick v.
McFadden 121 a trespassing incident turned into a brawl, and both
parties charged the other party with starting the incident. 2 2 The
court determined that evidence of the parties' character for violence
was admissible to prove which party was the first aggressor. 23 The
court concluded that character evidence is admissible in this
situation even if the parties were not aware of each other's
reputation for violence. 24
In summary, under the first theory of the minority position,
character evidence is admissible in civil cases involving conduct
that is essentially criminal in nature. 25 Proponents of this theory
reason that it is inconsistent to. permit character evidence in a
criminal trial but not in a civil trial concerning exactly the same
conduct. ' 26 The following section discusses the second theory of the
minority position. This theory authorizes the introduction of
character evidence in a civil trial if the evidence fits within the
rationale that authorizes the introduction of character evidence in a
criminal trial.
B. CIvil. APPLICATIONS OF THE. RATIONALE ALLOWING
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
The second rationale for admitting character evidence in civil
trials is premised on the rationale for admitting character evidence
in criminal trials. 27 This approach considers the defendant's risk of
loss in a civil trial, 28 and also fills the void created when character
119. See, e.g., Carrick v. McFadden, 216 Kan. 683, 687, 533 P.2d 1249, 1253 (1975).
120. Id. at 686, 533 P.2d at 1251-52. Evidence ofa party's reputation or character for violence is
admissilblc when there is a dispute concerning who was the first aggressor, regardless of"whether the
defndant has pleaded self-defense, and even if the defendant did not know of such character or
reputation." Id. (quoting Annotation, Admissibility qf Evidence qf Character or Reputation of Party in Civil
Action.fir Aosault, 154 A.L.R. 121, 134 (1945)).
121. 216 Kan. 683,533 P.2d 1249(1975).
122. Carrick v. McFadden, 216 Kan. 683, 684-85, 687, 533 P.2d 1249, 1250-51, 1253 (1975).
123. Id. at 687, 533 P.2d at 1253.
124. Id.
125. Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of Crumpton, see supra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
126. See Crumpton, 672 F.2d at 1254 (court should admit character evidence in civil trial because
it would be admitted in a criminal case concerning the same conduct).
127. See Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn. 468, 472-73, 81 N.W.522, 523 (1900) (character evidence
admissible to defend suit for seduction).
128. Seegenerally Falknor, supra note 80, at 582 (discussing various consequences of loss in a civil
trial).
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evidence is the only evidence available in a civil trial. 1
29
1. Risk of Civil Loss Equal to Criminal Loss
The minority rule admits character evidence in civil trials in
which the defendant risks losing as much as the accused in a
criminal trial. 130 In Hein v. Holdridge 131 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant seduced the plaintiff's daughter. 132 The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that evidence of the defendant's chastity
was admissible to counter the seduction charge. 133 The court
reasoned that character evidence should be admitted when the
same factors justifying its admission in criminal cases are present in
a civil case. 134 Courts admit character evidence in criminal cases
because the accused faces a potential loss of liberty or even life.
135
However, the court in Hein reasoned that a civil defendant often
stands to lose as much or more than a criminal defendant, since he
risks "his fortune, his honor, [and] his family.' 1 36  A civil
defendant also risks being penalized with exemplary damages. 1
37
The court in Hein determined that the civil/criminal
distinction is not an effective means of determining when character
129. Cf In reFerrill, 97 N.M. 383,-, 640 P.2d 489, 497 (Ct. App. 1981) (character evidence
allowed when no other evidence available to defend claim).
130. See, e.g., Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn. 468, 472-73, 81 N.W.522, 523 (1900).
131. 78 Minn. 468, 81 N.W. 522 (1900).
132. Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn. 468,470, 81 N.W. 522, 522 (1900).
133. Id. at 474, 81 N.W. at 523. The concurring justice in Hein argued that character evidence
should be admitted "whenever the charge made in a civil action imputes any kind of moral turpitude
to a defendant, such as fraud or falsehood or kindred delinquencies'." Id. at 474, 81 N.W. at 523
(Collins,.T., concurring).
134. Id. at 472-74, 81 N.W. at 523. The court employed the following language to explain why
it (lid not follow the general rule excluding character evidence in civil trials:
Inasmuch as the general rule is not based upon any philosophical reason, but is merely
one of convenience, it ought not to be applied to cases where justice to the defendant
requires that the inconvenience arising from a confusion of the issues should be
disregarded, and he be permitted to give evidence of his previous good character, or,
in other words, that such evidence ought to be received in a civil action when it is of a
character to bring it within all of the reasons for admitting such evidence in criminal
cases.
Id. at 472, 81 N.W. at 523.
135. See id. at 472-73, 81 N.W. at 523.
136. Id.; see also Falknor, supra note 80, at 582. Professor Falknor states that a civil defendant
risks "not only his money or property but, when charged with criminal or immoral acts, his honor
and reputation as well." Id.
137. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1978). Section 32-03-07 provides as follows:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant.
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evidence should be admitted. 38 The court noted the irony in the
failure to distinguish between the grave consequences faced by an
accused in a felony case and the minor consequences faced by an
accused in a misdemeanor case. 39 For example, a civil defendant
in a million dollar negligence suit may not introduce character
evidence because it might confuse the issue; yet a criminal
defendant charged with simple assault, who faces a fine of perhaps
one hundred dollars, is free to admit evidence of his good
character. 140
The continued use of character evidence in criminal trials
demonstrates the relevance of such evidence to the determination of
how a person acted on a given occasion. 141 Assuming that character
evidence is relevant, the remaining justification for the traditional
rule centers around the inconvenience and distraction caused by
character evidence.14 2 Prohibiting character evidence in civil trials
because of these factors duplicates the function of rule 403 of the
North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 43 Rule 403 allows a judge to
weigh the probative value of evidence against its tendency to
confuse the issues, waste time, and cause unfair prejudice. 4 4 The
traditional rule preempts a judge's opportunity to weigh evidence
under rule 403.145
2. Character Evidence Admitted in Civil Cases when no Other
Evidence Is Available
The traditional rule allows a criminal defendant to introduce
evidence of his good character because he often has very little other
138. Hein, 78 Minn. at 472, 81 N.W. at 523.
139. Id. at 472-73, 81 N.W. at 523.
140. See id. at 473, 81 N.W. at 523. The court in Hein offered the following example of the irony
of the civil/criminal distinction:
Ought a defendant in such a [civill case to be deprived of the right to lay before the
Jury evidence of his previous good character, because it will tend to confuse the issue,
while a defendant in a case where the state charges him with a simple assault,
involving no more serious consequences than the payment, perhaps, of a fine of five
dollars, is accorded the absolute right to give such evidence? The question has been
answered in the negative by this court.
Id.
141. Falknor, supra note 80, at 583.
142. Id. Professor Falknor includes the following as "counter- factors" to relevant evidence:
"prejudice, distraction from the issues, time consumption, and hazard of surprise." Id. at 582.
143. See N.D. R. Evto. 403. For the text of rule 403, see supra note 58.
144. See id.
145. Falknor, supra note 80, at 584. In the absence of the traditional rule, character evidence still
may be excluded under rule 403 "but if so it will not be because there is an inflexible exclusionary
rule, but because, in the context, the .judge .... balancing probative worth against the enumerated
dangers, is persuaded that one or more of the latter should control." Id.
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evidence available.' 46 This reasoning has spilled over into some
areas of the civil law. For example, some courts admit evidence of
the good character of the beneficiary of a will when the will is
challenged on the grounds of undue influence. 147 If the testator is
dead, the beneficiary has virtually no way to prove, except by
evidence of his good character, that he did not unduly influence the
testator. 148 Thus civil cases in which character evidence is the only
available evidence fall precisely within the rationale for admitting
character evidence in criminal cases. 1
49
To summarize, the minority rule, which admits character
evidence in civil trials, is based on two theories. The first theory
admits character evidence in civil trials that resemble criminal
trials, such as a civil trial for assault.150 The second theory admits
character evidence in civil trials in which a defendant has no other
available evidence, or risks a large loss of money or reputation. 151
Determining the admissibility of character evidence by an
independent logical analysis under the minority theory is more
precise and therefore, more just than a system that depends upon
the broad classifications of "civil" and "criminal."
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional rule, which excludes character evidence in civil
trials, lives on, even in the absence of a sound reason for allowing
such evidence in criminal but not civil trials. 152 The distinction
originated as an expedient technique for identifying cases in which
146. Uviller, supra note 27, at 855.
147. See, e.g., Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, __ , 265 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1980) (testimony by
members of propounder's church concerning his character admissible to counter undue influence
claim); In re Ferrill, 97 N.M. 383, __, 640 P.2d 489, 497 (Ct. App. 1981) (opinion of
propounder's employer concerning propounder's character admissible to prove undue influence); In
re Olsson's Estate, 344 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (character evidence admissible even
when tendency to exert undue influence is not an element of undue influence claim); Perry v.
Vaught, 624 P.2d 776, 784 (Wyo. 1981) (evidence of propounder's character admissible to prove
undue influence in farm land transfer).
Courts also admit character evidence in civil sexual assault cases because, due to the
surreptitious nature of a sexual assault, often the only evidence with which an innocent person may
defend themself is with evidence of their prior good character. See, e.g., Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn.
468, 472-73, 81 N.W. 522, 523 (1900). For a duscussion of Hein, see supra notes 131-40 and
accompanying text.
148. See In re Ferrill, 97 N.M. 383, __ , 640 P.2d 489, 497 (Ct. App. 1981) (character evidence
admitted when there was no other evidence available to defend a claim).
149. See Uviller, supra note 27, at 855.
150. See, e.g., Carrick v. McFadden, 216 Kan. 683, 687, 533 P.2d 1249, 1253 (1975) (character
evidence admissible in civil trial to determine which party was first aggressor). For a discussion of
this aspect of the minority rule, see supra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Hein v. Holdridge, 78 Minn. 468, 472-73, 81 N.W. 522, 523 (1900) (allowing
character evidence in civil case due to grave consequences of loss). For a discussion of this aspect of
the minority rule, see supra notes 127-45 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
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the defendant was substantially at risk of incurring a significant
loss.' 53 The traditional rule only marginally serves this purpose
because it ignores civil cases in which a defendant faces severe
penalties. 54 The traditional rule also seeks to minimize the
inconvenience and distraction caused by character evidence.
155
However, modern rules of evidence allow a judge to exclude
relevant evidence if necessary to expedite a trial. 
1 56
The traditional rule excludes too much relevant evidence. The
minority position is more precise than the traditional rule because it
is based on logical analysis rather than on mere reference to civil
and criminal labels. The minority position makes it possible for
more relevant evidence to reach the trier of fact in a civil trial. The
more relevant evidence to which the trier of fact has access, the
more just will be its determination. If the judge finds that the
distraction or inconvenience of proffered character evidence
outweighs its probative value, he may exclude it under rule 403 of
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. The traditional rule, which
forces the judge to exclude all character evidence because it is
sometimes distracting, unnecessarily duplicates the function of rule
403. North Dakota courts should adopt the minority rule and allow
the admission of character evidence in civil trials when the
defendant is in danger of suffering a significant loss, or when the
distraction caused by character evidence is minor in comparison to
its probative value.
MICHAEL DIETZ
153. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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